Philippines completes first computerized polls
By Melvin G. Calimag , ZDNet AsiaTuesday, August 12, 2008 08:35 PM
PHILIPPINES--Despite threats of postponement and intermittent skirmishes between rebel and government troops, the country's first computerized election has been conducted smoothly--though only in some parts of the troubled Mindanao region.
The automated polls proceeded with minor problems on Aug. 11, with about 85 percent of 10.5 million registered voters casting their vote, according to election officials. The landmark election was confined within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), an aggregation of areas in the southern island populated mostly by Muslim inhabitants.
The Philippine government spent some 600 million pesos (US$13.6 million) in the computerized election, which served as a test-pilot for the country's general elections in 2010.
The Commission on Elections (Comelec) said a few voting machines malfunctioned during the election, but these were promptly fixed by local contractors.
The Comelec used two electronic voting systems for the polls: DRE (direct recording electronic) system for the province of Maguindanao, and OMR (optical mark reader) technology for the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Shariff Kabunsuan and Lanao del Sur.
The DRE system allows voters to select on-screen the picture of the candidate they wish to elect. With the OMR technology, voters are required to shade an oval box next to the candidate's name on a paper ballot, which will then be scanned and the vote automatically captured by OMR-enabled machines.
The Comelec, tasked to determine which technology will be used for the 2010 elections, deployed about 3,300 machines in Maguindanao and 156 automated counting machines in the other five provinces.
Elections commissioner Moslemen Macarambon reported that Rajah Buayan, located some 45 kilometers from the provincial capitol, was the first municipality in Maguindanao to transmit its election results.
Asked about the polls in the entire province of Maguindanao, Macarambon said: "[It was] generally smooth [and] orderly because no single report of any untoward incident has reached us."
He estimated the total voter-turnout in the province was at least 85 percent, based on election results transmitted so far, to the counting center.
The election had proceeded amid hostilities--that escalated on election day--between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the country's military forces, in the neighboring province of North Cotabato and a significant part of Maguindanao.
Comelec spokesperson James Jimenez said in a blog post that the ARMM poll was a significant milestone in the country's election reform, noting that voters showed enthusiasm in using automated voting machines amid security problems. "We have seen the long queues of voters eagerly waiting for their turn to vote using the electronic voting machines," Jimenez said.
Vince Dizon, spokesperson for equipment supplier Smartmatic-Sahi, said in a statement that the computer glitches encountered in some precincts should not be considered a major problem since the company's field support technicians were quick to resolve the bugs.
"We had deployed backup machines to serve as contingency in case any of the machines were bogged down," Dizon said.
Smartmatic-Sahi also set up a call center in Manila to serve as technical support hub for its field support technicians, who were deployed in the various voting centers across Maguindanao and canvassing centers in the rest of the provinces within the ARMM.
Local TV reports also featured voters who said the automated voting machines were more convenient and easy to use, compared to the manual voting process. The reports also included interviews with poll precinct officials, particularly teachers, who said the automated systems were easier to use and administer.
A TV news report noted that the main office of the Comelec was able to provide a preliminary tally of votes just a few hours after the precincts closed, compared to the weeks--if not, months--previously required using the manual system.
The Comelec added that the actual printing of official ballots was broadcast live over the Internet a few days before the election was held.
A 22-man foreign delegation from Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Cambodia and Thailand, also observed the election process.
The Philippine government had attempted to postpone the use of computerized voting in the election, because it was involved in ongoing negotiations with the MILF and wanted the separatist group to participate in the electoral exercise.
However, Comelec commissioner Rene Sarmiento made an impassioned speech to a Congressional committee urging the country to take the opportunity to trial the e-voting system.
"No elections, no lessons in automation, and no equipment to use if and when the elections push through," Sarmiento had said. "The peace formula should be: on with the peace process, on with the electionsÂ… Let us proceed with the elections, and together reap the benefits of automation."
Melvin G. Calimag is a freelance IT writer based in the Philippines.
Sunday, June 21, 2009
Another Issue
Electronic voting, electronic cheating?
When I was awarded a six-week research fellowship by the University of Oxford’s Internet Institute, I chose to focus on electronic voting. (The term more commonly used in the Philippines is “automated elections”.) My research confirmed my initial suspicion that electronic voting and counting machines bring their own set of troubles. I realized that the COMELEC, as well as the media and the public, should therefore take extra steps to ensure the integrity of automated elections.
One of the things I did was review the experiences of countries that had earlier automated their elections. And I found well-documented cases of problems, errors and failures (download: Automated elections: voting machines have made mistakes too).
These cases included: uninitialized machines, which made ballot stuffing possible; votes not counted or lost; candidates’ votes reversed; contests not counted; ballots not counted; the wrong winner comes out; allowing voting more than once; vote totals that exceed the number of registered voters; negatives votes; unauthorized software replacement; and other problems.
I traced these troubles to deep-seated causes that were inherent with complex technologies, such as: software bugs, which are always present even in high-quality software; hardware problems such as miscalibration; environmental stresses that may worsen hardware problems; poor or flawed design; human errors; and malicious tampering. Since these factors were inherent with complex technologies, we can expect the electronic machine troubles to persist.
In my research, I also found out that insoluble problems associated with direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines have already led to their phase out in some states of the U.S.
I also compiled typical costs for DREs and optical scanners (download: The cost of automating elections), and found that DRE technology was much more expensive to implement that optical scanning. (However, because an increasing number of states are junking DREs, their prices are expected to go down, as they are dumped into the Third World.)
Halalang Marangal (HALAL), an election monitoring group that I work with, has already submitted two specific recommendations to the COMELEC as a result of my Oxford study:
1. Use double-entry accounting methods in election tabulation (download: Double-entry accounting in election tallies)to minimize the clerical errors that plague the COMELEC’s current single-entry tabulation system; and
2. Conduct a transparent post-election audit of machine results (download: Post-election audits using statistical sampling), by manually counting ballots from a random sample of precincts to confirm if the electronic voting machines are giving us correct results.
Given the reported problems in the August 2008 ARMM elections, which seem to confirm these troubles with automated elections and voting machines, I again strongly urge the COMELEC to heed our warnings and suggestions. machines), the software operative in same, election management software, and canvassing software for a central location's servers. It includes several security mechanisms, such as encryption using a public key infrastructure (PKI) with 2048-bit digital certificates.
According to Roberto Verzola
When I was awarded a six-week research fellowship by the University of Oxford’s Internet Institute, I chose to focus on electronic voting. (The term more commonly used in the Philippines is “automated elections”.) My research confirmed my initial suspicion that electronic voting and counting machines bring their own set of troubles. I realized that the COMELEC, as well as the media and the public, should therefore take extra steps to ensure the integrity of automated elections.
One of the things I did was review the experiences of countries that had earlier automated their elections. And I found well-documented cases of problems, errors and failures (download: Automated elections: voting machines have made mistakes too).
These cases included: uninitialized machines, which made ballot stuffing possible; votes not counted or lost; candidates’ votes reversed; contests not counted; ballots not counted; the wrong winner comes out; allowing voting more than once; vote totals that exceed the number of registered voters; negatives votes; unauthorized software replacement; and other problems.
I traced these troubles to deep-seated causes that were inherent with complex technologies, such as: software bugs, which are always present even in high-quality software; hardware problems such as miscalibration; environmental stresses that may worsen hardware problems; poor or flawed design; human errors; and malicious tampering. Since these factors were inherent with complex technologies, we can expect the electronic machine troubles to persist.
In my research, I also found out that insoluble problems associated with direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines have already led to their phase out in some states of the U.S.
I also compiled typical costs for DREs and optical scanners (download: The cost of automating elections), and found that DRE technology was much more expensive to implement that optical scanning. (However, because an increasing number of states are junking DREs, their prices are expected to go down, as they are dumped into the Third World.)
Halalang Marangal (HALAL), an election monitoring group that I work with, has already submitted two specific recommendations to the COMELEC as a result of my Oxford study:
1. Use double-entry accounting methods in election tabulation (download: Double-entry accounting in election tallies)to minimize the clerical errors that plague the COMELEC’s current single-entry tabulation system; and
2. Conduct a transparent post-election audit of machine results (download: Post-election audits using statistical sampling), by manually counting ballots from a random sample of precincts to confirm if the electronic voting machines are giving us correct results.
Given the reported problems in the August 2008 ARMM elections, which seem to confirm these troubles with automated elections and voting machines, I again strongly urge the COMELEC to heed our warnings and suggestions. machines), the software operative in same, election management software, and canvassing software for a central location's servers. It includes several security mechanisms, such as encryption using a public key infrastructure (PKI) with 2048-bit digital certificates.
According to Roberto Verzola
Benefits of automated system according to SAES
If your electoral agency seeks a fully-automated, electronic voting system that is completely secure, reliable and auditable, the Smartmatic Auditable Election System (SAES) is your solution. Proven under the rigorous scrutiny of independent international monitors in several national and regional elections, SAES has distinguished itself as the system beyond reproach.
The powerful combination of robust hardware, secure software and highly qualified personnel enables the SAES system to guarantee elections that voters can trust, in any part of the world. From its voting machines that feature a variety of vote input devices, customizable interfaces and printed voter receipts, to its secure data transmission networks, high-end tallying servers, immediate results tabulation and fully auditable paper trail, the SAES technological platform is the only end-to–end system available that ensures democracy rules, cost effectively.
Security
The impenetrable architecture of SAES is the result of a number of security mechanisms that we created by combining internationally recognized and standard-based security algorithms. You won’t have to worry about election tampering.
Immediacy
Not only do SAES voting machines allow voters to cast their choice more quickly, they allow the results to be known just minutes after the last polling place has closed.
Veracity
Smartmatic was the first company in the world to include printed receipts so every voter can verify that their on screen selections were recorded accurately. This not only establishes an auditable paper trail, but invites public trust and establishes the credibility of the election.
Economy
The digital voting process reduces the cost of holding an election because it requires greatly reduced human and economic resources. In addition, a thousand tons of paper can be saved because the need to print anything is eliminated almost entirely!
Auditing
A prerequisite of Smartmatic’s engagement is that a series of audits are undertaken before, during and after the election. SAES has been designed to make this a simple procedure, creating what we believe is the most transparent automated-voting process available in the world.
Flexibility
Your electorate has its own laws and conventions for tallying votes. That’s why SAES has been designed to make configuration for different tallying methods easy. Whether you use D’Hondt, simple majority, relative majority or other counting methods, you won’t incur costly reprogramming fees.
Accessibility
Voters with disabilities can be accommodated comfortably by SAES voting machines. Buttons with specific shapes and colors, sip-and-puff devices and special earphones are just some of the features our machines possess in order to guarantee equality and independence for all voters.
Versatility
Smartmatic recognizes the value of innovations that contribute to security so we engineered SAES in a way that lets it integrate readily with civil registration and voter identification systems. SAES makes it easier to build on the security platform you already have in place.
Autonomy
In those cases where an electoral agency requires operational control, Smartmatic provides licensing solutions. Structured as a turnkey agreement with ongoing support, the technology transfer can be achieved in the mid- to long- term, after training has been completed.
The powerful combination of robust hardware, secure software and highly qualified personnel enables the SAES system to guarantee elections that voters can trust, in any part of the world. From its voting machines that feature a variety of vote input devices, customizable interfaces and printed voter receipts, to its secure data transmission networks, high-end tallying servers, immediate results tabulation and fully auditable paper trail, the SAES technological platform is the only end-to–end system available that ensures democracy rules, cost effectively.
Security
The impenetrable architecture of SAES is the result of a number of security mechanisms that we created by combining internationally recognized and standard-based security algorithms. You won’t have to worry about election tampering.
Immediacy
Not only do SAES voting machines allow voters to cast their choice more quickly, they allow the results to be known just minutes after the last polling place has closed.
Veracity
Smartmatic was the first company in the world to include printed receipts so every voter can verify that their on screen selections were recorded accurately. This not only establishes an auditable paper trail, but invites public trust and establishes the credibility of the election.
Economy
The digital voting process reduces the cost of holding an election because it requires greatly reduced human and economic resources. In addition, a thousand tons of paper can be saved because the need to print anything is eliminated almost entirely!
Auditing
A prerequisite of Smartmatic’s engagement is that a series of audits are undertaken before, during and after the election. SAES has been designed to make this a simple procedure, creating what we believe is the most transparent automated-voting process available in the world.
Flexibility
Your electorate has its own laws and conventions for tallying votes. That’s why SAES has been designed to make configuration for different tallying methods easy. Whether you use D’Hondt, simple majority, relative majority or other counting methods, you won’t incur costly reprogramming fees.
Accessibility
Voters with disabilities can be accommodated comfortably by SAES voting machines. Buttons with specific shapes and colors, sip-and-puff devices and special earphones are just some of the features our machines possess in order to guarantee equality and independence for all voters.
Versatility
Smartmatic recognizes the value of innovations that contribute to security so we engineered SAES in a way that lets it integrate readily with civil registration and voter identification systems. SAES makes it easier to build on the security platform you already have in place.
Autonomy
In those cases where an electoral agency requires operational control, Smartmatic provides licensing solutions. Structured as a turnkey agreement with ongoing support, the technology transfer can be achieved in the mid- to long- term, after training has been completed.
Is The Philippines Ready for an Automated Election System?
The computerized or automated election in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) scheduled on August 11, 2008 is being threatened by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). On the other hand, this article is not about politics in the Philippines. This is about the computerization of the Philippine election system.
Are Filipinos ready for automation? Let me give you some facts about the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) then give your thoughts if the Philippines is ready for an automated election system (AES) as mandated by law (RA 9369 - Automated Election Law):
According to Comelec, “DRE uses electronic ballot, records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro optical components that can be activated by the voter, processes data by means of a computer program, records voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting results electronically.”
The automated ARMM election is a pretest to the 2010 Presidential elections in the Philippines. If this test succeeds, then for sure the Automated Election System will be used. If not, then maybe the Philippine government will consider going back to the “control” method which is the conventional election most Filipinos are used to or improve any weaknesses that will be identified in the implementation of the computerized election process.
This brings to mind the question, “How reliable can the computerized (automated) election system be?” knowing that anything electronic is much easier to falsify. Will the election finally put an end to the “dagdag-bawas” dilemma in our nation’s election results? Or, will the automation process make it much easier to fake election returns? Is the software in the machines in the automated election properly tested and proven bug-free? That we will find out after the ARMM elections. Let the “trial-and-error” in our election process begin on August 11, 2008.
Are Filipinos ready for automation? Let me give you some facts about the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) then give your thoughts if the Philippines is ready for an automated election system (AES) as mandated by law (RA 9369 - Automated Election Law):
- The 2003 functional literacy survey of the National Statistics Office (NSO) showed ARMM as having the lowest basic literacy rate in the country, with 30 percent of its people aged 10-64 years old considered illiterate.
On a national level, one in 10 Filipinos can not read and write, according to the survey.- Ustadz Esmael Ibrahim of the Assembly of Darul Ifta of the Philippines said illiteracy in the ARMM is worst in Sulu, with 40 percent of its people unlearned.
In addition, according to reports, two voting technologies will be used in the ARMM elections - Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) in Maguindanao, and Optical Mark Reader (OMR) in Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. More than 3,000 DRE machines and 156 OMR counting machines will be delivered to ARMM.
According to Comelec, “DRE uses electronic ballot, records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro optical components that can be activated by the voter, processes data by means of a computer program, records voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting results electronically.”
The automated ARMM election is a pretest to the 2010 Presidential elections in the Philippines. If this test succeeds, then for sure the Automated Election System will be used. If not, then maybe the Philippine government will consider going back to the “control” method which is the conventional election most Filipinos are used to or improve any weaknesses that will be identified in the implementation of the computerized election process.
This brings to mind the question, “How reliable can the computerized (automated) election system be?” knowing that anything electronic is much easier to falsify. Will the election finally put an end to the “dagdag-bawas” dilemma in our nation’s election results? Or, will the automation process make it much easier to fake election returns? Is the software in the machines in the automated election properly tested and proven bug-free? That we will find out after the ARMM elections. Let the “trial-and-error” in our election process begin on August 11, 2008.
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